
### DYNAMICS AND ISSUES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND

Carmen Navarro Departmento de Ciencia Política Universidad Autónoma de Madrid c.navarro@uam.es


# Outline

- The project
- The measurements
- The results
- Implications
- Conclusions



# LAI 2.0 Project

- Update of the first release (2018; 39 countries)
- Extend the timespan 1990-2020
- Extend the geographical reach to 57
- Funded by the European Commission
- Collection of supplementary data on LG (causes and impacts)



# Project organisation

- Leading House: Graduate Institute of Public Administration (IDHEAP) at the University of Lausanne
  - Prof. Dr. Andreas Ladner
- Country group coordinators:
  - Prof. Harald Baldersheim, University of Oslo
  - Prof. Pawel Swianiewicz, University of Warsaw
  - Prof. Nikos Hlepas, University of Athens
  - Prof. Kristof Steyvers, Ghent University
  - Prof. Carmen Navarro, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
  - Prof. Andreas Ladner, Université de Lausanne
- Countries covered: 57  $\rightarrow$  66 people involved !!!
  - EU, CoE and OECD member States
  - Missing: Azerbaijan (CoE), Monaco (CoE), San Marino (CoE), New Zealand (OECD) and Costa Rica (joined OECD in 2021)
  - Including: Argentina, Belarus, Kosovo and South Africa

# Country group coordinators

- Prof. Harald Baldersheim, University of Oslo
- Prof. Pawel Swianiewicz, University of Warsaw
- Prof. Nikos Hlepas, University of Athens
- Prof. Kristof Steyvers, Ghent University
- Prof. Carmen Navarro, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
- Prof. Sabine Kuhlmann, Potsdam University
- Prof. Andreas Ladner, Université de Lausanne
- Dr. Nicolas Keuffer, Université de Lausanne
- Mr. Alexander Bastianen, Université de Lausanne

Prof. Harald	<ul> <li>18. Denmark</li> </ul>	Prof. Pawel	19. Estonia
Baldersheim,	<ul> <li>20. Finland</li> </ul>	Swianiewicz,	32. Latvia
University of Oslo	<ul> <li>26. Iceland</li> </ul>	University of	<ul> <li>34. Lithuania</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>44. Norway</li> </ul>	Warsaw	<ul> <li>17. Czech Republic</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>56. Sweden</li> </ul>		45. Poland
Prof. Nikolaos	<ul> <li>16. Cyprus</li> </ul>	-	<ul> <li>52. Slovakia</li> </ul>
Hlepas, University	24. Greece		<ul> <li>53. Slovenia</li> </ul>
of Athens	<ul> <li>37. Malta</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>15. Hungary</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>58. Turkey</li> </ul>		31. Romania
	<ul> <li>28. Israel</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>4. Bulgaria</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>49. Russian Federation</li> </ul>		• 5. Croatia
Prof. Carmen	<ul> <li>29. Italy</li> </ul>		• 51. Serbia
Navarro	<ul> <li>55. Spain</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>9. Bosnia and Herzegovina</li> </ul>
University of	<ul> <li>46. Portugal</li> </ul>		Albania
Madrid	2. Andorra		<ul> <li>25. Moldova</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>40. Monaco</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>12. Georgia</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>50. San Marino</li> </ul>		39. Ukraine
	<ul> <li>3. Argentina</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>26. Montenegro</li> </ul>
	• 13. Chile		<ul> <li>36. North Macedonia</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>14. Colombia</li> </ul>		4. Armenia
	<ul> <li>38. Mexico</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>7. Azerbaijan</li> </ul>
Prof. Kristof	<ul> <li>8. Belgium</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>10. Belarus</li> </ul>
Steyvers, Ghent	<ul> <li>42. Netherlands</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>31. Kosovo</li> </ul>
University	<ul> <li>35. Luxembourg</li> </ul>	Prof. Sabine	<ul> <li>6. Austria</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>5. Australia</li> </ul>	Kuhlmann,	<ul> <li>23. Germany</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>43. New Zealand</li> </ul>	University of	21. France
Prof. Andreas	<ul> <li>57. Switzerland</li> </ul>	Potsdam	
Ladner,	<ul> <li>33. Liechtenstein</li> </ul>	Dr. Nicolas Keuffer,	• 12. Canada
University of	<ul> <li>60. UK</li> </ul>	University of	<ul> <li>61. United States of</li> </ul>
Lausanne	<ul> <li>17. Ireland</li> </ul>	Lausanne	America <sup>1</sup>
	<ul> <li>54. South Africa</li> </ul>	Alexander	• 30. Japan
		Bastianen,	<ul> <li>47. Republic of Korea</li> </ul>
		University of	
		Lausanne	
		Total	61

# LAI 2.0 Conceptual Framework

- LA: freedom of management and decision-making of local public authorities (CoE 1985 Charter)
- LA as a relative concept that expresses above all the formal (vertical) modes of intergovernmental relationships ("freedom from" Pratchett, 2004)
- LA as a multi-dimensional phenomenon (legal, functional, financial, political and organizational aspects)
- Interdisciplinary approach: law, economics, political science, public administration
- Local autonomy seen with strong normative component:
  - International organizations have promoted decentralization reforms
  - Political philosophers: a necessary condition for strong citizen participation, greater accountability, increased attachment to the community, improved economic efficiency.

### But....

 LA seen more as means of achieving desirable effects from a democratic perspective than a positive value in itself

http://local-autonomy.andreasladner.ch

# LAI 2.0 Measurements

Seven dimensions:

- 1. Legal autonomy: the legal status and protection of local authorities within the state
- 2. Access: the degree of influence that local authorities exert on political decisions at higher levels of government
- 3. Policy scope: the range of functions for which local authorities are responsible
- 4. Political discretion: the range of functions over which local authorities have a say
- 5. Financial autonomy: the financial resources of local authorities and the ability to decide on their sources
- 6. Organizational autonomy: the free organization of local political systems and administrations
- 7. Noninterference: the degree of liberty left by higher levels of government in their control of local authorities.

# LAI 2.0 Measurements

Eleven indicators (variables):

- 1. Institutional depth: the extent to which local government is formally autonomous and can choose the tasks it wants to perform
- 2. Policy scope: the range of functions (tasks) where local government assumes responsibility for the delivery of services (whether provided by municipal personnel or through other arrangements)
- 3. Effective political discretion: the extent to which local government can make final decisions over the functions listed under policy scope
- 4. Fiscal autonomy: the extent to which local government can independently tax its population
- 5. Financial transfer system: the proportion of unconditional financial transfers to total financial transfers received by local government
- 6. Financial self-reliance: the proportion of local government revenues derived from own/local sources (taxes, fees, charges over which local government has influence)
- 7. Borrowing autonomy: the extent to which local government can borrow
- 8. Organizational autonomy: the extent to which local government is free to decide about its own organization and electoral system
- 9. Legal protection: the existence of constitutional or legal means to assert local autonomy
- 10. Administrative supervision: the extent to which administrative supervision of local government is (un)obtrusive
- 11. Central or regional access: the extent to which local authorities have channels to influence higher level **governments'** policy-making.

## Institutional Depth

0-3

### Institutional depth

The extent to which local government is formally autonomous and can choose the tasks they want to perform

Additional coding instructions: Whether a municipality is responsible for, the different tasks and/or has the financial resources is not the question here. Indeed, the coding has to comply with the legal framework in the respective countries. This means that the coding refers to the status of local government according to the constitution and other relevant legislation; if there are deeply contradictory regulations, this should be reflected in the coding and also mentioned in the notes.

0 local authorities can only perform mandated tasks

1 local authorities can choose from a very narrow, predefined scope of tasks

2 local authorities are explicitly autonomous and can choose from a wide scope of predefined tasks

3 local authorities are free to take on any new tasks (residual competencies) not assigned to other levels of government

Local A	Auton	nomy l	ndex	2.0 (2	015-20	020)																			_
Country	: Croa	tia (HR\	/)																						
Units of aggregatio n	year	institutio nal depth	policy scope	effective political discretion	fiscal autonomy	financial transfer system	financial self- reliance	borrowing autonomy		org	anisational	autonomy ((	)-4)		self-rule	le	gal protecti		administr ative supervisio n	central o	r regional ac	cess (0-3):	interactiv e rule	LA	Nun of le gove
		(0-3)	(0-4)	<u>[0-4]</u>	(0-4)	(0-3)	(0-3)	(0-3)	Electoral sy Elected by council or citizens (0- 1)	Decide elements of political system (0-2)	Hire their own staff (0-0.5)	Administra Fix salary of employees (0-0.5)	Choose organisati onal structure (0-0.5)	Establish legal entities (0- 0.5)	(0-28)	Constituti onal clauses (0- 1)	Recourse to constituti onal courts (0- 1)	Other means (0- 1)	(0-3)		Represent ation (0-1)	Informal channels (0-1)	(0-9)	(0-37)	
c	2015	3,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	0,25	0,25	0,50	14,50	1,00	0,50	1,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	5,50	20,0	5
1	2016	3,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50		0,25	0,50	14,50	1,00	0,50	1,00	and the second se		a second s	1,00		1000000	5
р	2017	3,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	0,25	0,25	0,50	14,50	1,00	0,50	1,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	5,50	20,0	5
a	2018	3,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	0,25	0,25	0,50	14,50	1,00	0,50	1,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	5,50	20,0	2 C
1	2019	3,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	0,25	0,25	0,50	14,50	1,00	0,50	1,00	2,00	0,00	0,00	1,00	5,50	20,0	j i
i	2020	3,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	0,25	0,25	0,50	14,50	1,00	0,50		2,00		0,00	1,00	5,50	20,0	
c	2015	3,00	2,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50		0,25	0,50	16,50	1,00					0,00	1,00	5,50		
i	2016	3,00	2,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50		0,25		16,50	1,00					0,00	1,00	5,50		
t	2017	3,00	2,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50		0,25		16,50	1,00						1,00			
1	2018	3,00	2,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50		0,25		16,50	1,00	2		4.5.7.2.10.		0,00	1,00	- CONTRACT	0000000	20
e	2019	3,00	2,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	and the second sec	0,25	0,50	16,50	1,00				the second	0,00	1,00	5,50	1	
Z	2020	3,00	2,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	0,25	0,25	0,50	16,50 17,50	1,00			2,00		0,00	1,00	5,50 5,50		
4	2015	3,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	0,25	0,25	0,50	17,50	1,00			01000000		0,00	1,00	1222000	1003686	55
	2018	3,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	Section.	0,25	0,50	17,50	1,00		1,00	2,00		0,00	1,00	1 23/3230	1 00000 00	42
6	2017	3,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50		0,25	0,50	17,50	1,00					0,00	1,00			
	2018	3,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	and the second se	0,25		17,50	1,00			1	a standard and a standard a standa	0,00	1,00	1 252,033	AS34599	219
e 2	2015	3,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	3,00	2,00	1,00	1,00	0,00	0,50	0,25	0,25		17,50	1,00	and the second se				0.00	1,00	<ol> <li>5085686</li> </ol>	10000	

# Policy Scope

Policy scope	Range of functions	0-4	Not at all, pa	artly, or	fully respons	sible for	:	
	(tasks) where local government assumes responsibility for the		Education	(0-3)	Social assistance	(0-3)	Health	(0-3)
	delivery of the services (whether it is provided by municipal		Land use	(0-2)	Public transport	(0-1)	Housing	(0-1)
	personnel or through other arrangements)		Police	(0-1)	Caring functions	(0-3)		
	Additional coding instructions: Here we want to know whether local government assumes responsibility for the delivery of these tasks and services. How much they can decide is part of the next question. Half points can be used if local government is only partly involved (i.e. additional coding instructions by fields of services below).							

Policy Scope: additional coding instructions Policy scope (0-4)

Range of functions (tasks) where local government assumes responsibility for the delivery of the services (whether it is provided by municipal personnel or through other arrangements)

You can use half of the points if local government assumes only a part of the responsibility – 0.5 in Land use and 0.25 in any other services.

Fields	Services	Codes					
	Pre-school (age 1-6)	For each of the services: +0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility					
Education (0-3)	Primary school (age 6-15)	for infra-structure and/or the delivery of services + 0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility					
	Secondary school (age 15-18)	for personnel, including staffing and salaries					
Social	Economic assistance (distress relief)	For each of the services: +0.5 point if local government assumes full for the					
assistance (0-3)	Work training/rehabilitation	organisation and/or delivery of services +0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility					
(0-5)	Integration of refugees	for personnel, including staffing and salaries					
	Primary health	For each of the services: +0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility					
Health (0-3)	Hospitals	for infra-structure and/or the delivery of services +0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility					
	Dental services	for personnel, including staffing and salaries					
Land use	Building permits	<ul> <li>+ 1 point if local government assumes full responsibility for administering building permits</li> </ul>					
(0-2)	Zoning	<ul> <li>+ 1 point if local government assumes full responsibility for administering zoning</li> </ul>					
Public	Bus transport services	+ 0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility for bus transport services					
transport (0-1)	Railway transport services	+ 0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility for railway transport services					
Housing	Housing and town development	+ 0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility for housing and town development					
(0-1)	Social housing	+ 0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility for social housing					
Police	Public Order	+ 0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility for public order					
(0-1)	Traffic police	+ 0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility for traffic police					
Caring	General caring services	For each of the services: +0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility					
Caring functions (0-3)	Services for special groups	for infra-structure and/or the availability of the service +0.5 point if local government assumes full responsibility					
(0-3)	Child protection	for personnel, including staffing and salaries					

# **Effective Political Discretion**

### Effective political discretion

services below).

The extent to which	0-4	No, some, o	r real a	uthoritative d	ecision-	making in:
local government can make final decisions over these functions		Education	(0-3)	Social assistance	(0-3)	Health
Additional coding instructions: Here we want to know whether municipal decision-		Land use	(0-2)	Public transport	(0-1)	Housing
makers are required by law to consult with, seek the permission, consent or cooperation of regional and national agencies before final decisions can be made or not. Half points can be used if local government can only partly decide (i.e. additional coding instructions by fields of		Police	(0-1)	Caring functions	(0-3)	

(0-3)

(0-1)

Effective political discretion: additional coding instructions

### Effective political discretion (0-4)

The extent to which local government can make final decisions over these functions

Fields	Services	Codes					
	Pre-school (age 1-6)	For each of the services: 0 if local government has no authoritative decision-making 0.5 if local government has some authoritative decision-					
Education (0-3)	Primary school (age 6-15)	making 1 if local government has real authoritative decision-making					
	Secondary school (age 15-18)						
	Economic assistance (distress relief)	For each of the services: 0 if local government has no authoritative decision-making 0.5 if local government has some authoritative decision-					
Social assistance (0-3)	Work training/rehabilitation	making 1 if local government has real authoritative decision-making					
	Integration of refugees						
	Primary health	For each of the services: 0 if local government has no authoritative decision-making 0.5 if local government has some authoritative decision-					
Health (0-3)	Hospitals	1 if local government has real authoritative decision- making					
	Dental services						
Land use	Building permits	For each of the services: 0 if local government has no authoritative decision-making 0.5 if local government has some authoritative decision-					
(0-2)	Zoning	making 1 if local government has real authoritative decision-making For each of the services: 0 if local government has no authoritative decision-making 0.25 if local government has some authoritative decision-					
Public	Bus transport services						
transport (0-1)	Railway transport services	making 0.5 if local government has real authoritative decision- making					
Housing	Housing and town development	For each of the services: 0 if local government has no authoritative decision-making 0.25 if local government has some authoritative decision-					
(0-1)	Social housing	making 0.5 if local government has real authoritative decision- making					
Police	Public Order	For each of the services: 0 if local government has no authoritative decision-making 0.25 if local government has some authoritative decision-					
(0-1)	Traffic police	0.5 if local government has real authoritative decision- making					
	General caring services	For each of the services: 0 if local government has no authoritative decision-making					
Caring functions (0-3)	Services for special groups	0.5 if local government has some authoritative decision- making 1 if local government has real authoritative decision-making					
(,	Child protection	-					

# Fiscal Autonomy

0-4

### Fiscal autonomy

The extent to which local government can independently tax its population

Additional coding instructions: For this dimension the level of contribution of the tax for local authorities (how much the tax actually yields) has to be clarified in the explanations. 0 local authorities do not set base and rate of any tax

1 local authorities set base or rate of minor taxes

2 local authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax) under restrictions stipulated by higher levels of government

3 local authorities set rate of one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax) with few or no restrictions

4 local authorities set base and rate of more than one major tax (personal income, corporate, value added, property or sales tax)

# Financial Transfer System

Financial transfer system	The proportion of unconditional financial transfers to total financial transfers received by the local government	0-3	0 conditional transfers are dominant (unconditional = 0- 40% of total transfers) 1 there is largely a balance between conditional and unconditional financial transfers (unconditional = 40- 60%)					
			2 unconditional financial transfers are dominant (unconditional = 60-80%)					
			3 nearly all transfers are unconditional (unconditional = 80-100%)					
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					

# Financial Self-Reliance

Financial selfreliance The proportion of local government revenues derived from own/local sources (taxes, fees, charges)

Additional coding instructions: A shared tax collected by central government and over which local government has no influence, has to be regarded as financial transfer. Please, make a note in your country report if this is the case.

- **0-3** 0 own sources yield less than 10% of total revenues
  - 1 own sources yield 10-25%
  - 2 own sources yield 25-50%
  - 3 own sources yield more than 50%

# Borrowing Autonomy

Borrowing	The extent to which	0-3	0 local authorities cannot borrow
autonomy	local government can borrow		1 local authorities may borrow under prior authorization by higher-level governments and with one or more of the following restrictions:
			a. golden rule (e. g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits)
			b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the regional or central bank only
			c. no borrowing above a ceiling, absolute level of subnational indebtedness, maximum debt-service ratio for new borrowing or debt brake mechanism
			d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes
			2 local authorities may borrow without prior authorization and under one or more of a), b), c) or d)
			3 local authorities may borrow without restriction imposed by higher-level authorities

# Organisational Autonomy

0-4

### Organisational autonomy

The extent to which local government is free to decide about its own organisation and electoral system

Additional coding instructions: If the status of staff (e.g. possibility to hire contract workers) is largely determined by national norms a maximum score of 0.25 is obtainable.

Local executives and election system (0-2):

(0-1) local executives are elected by the municipal council or directly by citizens

(0-1) local government can decide core elements of the political system (electoral districts, number of seats, electoral system)

Staff and local structures (0-2):

Local authorities:

Choose their

Hire their own staff (0-0.5)

Fix the salary of their employees (0-0.5)

Establish legal entities organisational structure and municipal and status of staff (0-0.5) enterprises (0-0.5)

# Legal Protection

Legal protection Existence of constitutional or legal means to assert local autonomy 0-3

(0-1) constitutional clauses or other statutory regulations protect local self-government

(0-1) local authorities have recourse to the judicial system through constitutional courts to settle disputes with higher authorities

(0-1) local authorities have recourse to the judicial system through administrative courts or ordinary courts to settle disputes with higher authorities or other means that protect local autonomy exist (e.g. listing of all municipalities in the constitution or the impossibility to force them to merge)

# Administrative Supervision


Administrative supervision	The extent to which administrative supervision of local	0-3	0 administrative supervision reviews legality as well as merits/expediency of municipal decisions
	government is (un)obtrusive		1 administrative supervision covers details of accounts and spending priorities
			2 administrative supervision only aims at ensuring compliance with law (legality of local decisions)
			3 there is very limited administrative supervision (e.g. the higher authorities cannot suspend a decision)

## Central or Regional Access

Central or regional access	The extent to which local authorities have channels to influence higher level	0-3	(0-1) local authorities have access to higher-level decision-making through formal consultation procedures and mechanisms
	governments' policy- making		(0-1) local authorities have access to higher-level decision-making through formal representation structures
	Additional coding instructions: Please clarify the channels and assess the extent of influence exercised upon the higher level.		(0-1) local authorities have access to higher-level decision-making through more informal channels (e.g. through trade unions that try to set the legislative agenda, party political networks, dual mandate holding, etc.)

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# Results: LAI ranking 2015-2020 (mean)




# Results: Country-level (2015-2020)


- Minimal changes in the last few years
  - Biggest increase: Portugal (+4,78%)
  - Biggest decrease: Austria (-5,78%)
- High degree of autonomy (>70): Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland together with Switzerland, France and Liechtenstein.
- Low degree of autonomy (<40): Cyprus, Malta, Israel, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Moldova.
- Mean value for all 57 countries: 57.16

Country	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Mean (2015- 2020)	Changes (2015-2020)
Albania	53,68	53,68	53,68	53,68	53,68	53,68	53,68	0,00
Andorra	57,95	57,95	57,95	60,78	60,78	60,78	59,36	2,83
Argentina	57,37	57,40	60,70	60,74	60,74	60,75	59,62	3,37
Armenia	42,76	44,07	44,09	44,12	45,89	46,08	44,50	3,32
Australia	50,32	50,32	50,32	50,32	50,32	50,32	50,32	0,00
Austria	62,74	62,74	63,33	62,42	62,51	56,96	61,78	-5,78
Belarus	38,48	38,48	38,48	38,49	38,49	38,49	38,49	0,01
Belgium	61,44	61,44	61,44	61,44	61,44	61,44	61,44	0,00
Bosnia and Herzegovina	51,33	51,32	51,98	51,91	51,90	52,07	51,75	0,74
Bulgaria	59,66	59,66	59,66	59,66	59,66	59,66	59,66	0,00
Canada	45,01	45,01	45,51	45,52	45,52	45,52	45,35	0,52
Chile	43,44	46,01	46,01	46,01	46,01	46,01	45,58	2,58
Colombia	67,72	67,72	67,72	67,72	67,72	67,72	67,72	0,00
Croatia	50,40	50,41	50,43	50,45	50,47	50,47	50,44	0,07
Cyprus	40,69	40,69	40,69	40,69	40,69	40,69	40,69	0,00
Czech Republic	56,79	56,79	56,79	56,79	56,79	56,79	56,79	0,00
Denmark	75,59	75,59	75,59	75,59	75,59	75,59	75,59	0,00
Estonia	62,75	62,75	62,75	62,75	62,75	62,75	62,75	0,00
Finland	85,73	85,73	85,73	85,73	85,73	85,73	85,73	0,00
France	75,63	75,63	75,63	75,63	75,63	75,63	75,63	0,00
Georgia	54,95	54,95	57,32	57,32	57,32	57,32	56,53	2,37
Gemany	66,11	66,11	66,11	66,11	66,11	66,11	66,11	0,00
Greece	59,60	59,60	60,56	60,56	61,39	61,39	60,52	1,79
Hungary	45,34	45,34	45,11	45,11	45,11	45,11	45,19	-0,23
loeland	76,37	76,37	76,37	76,37	76,37	75,41	76,21	-0,96
Ireland	43,12	43,12	43,12	43,12	43,12	43,12	43,12	0,00
Israel	39,01	39,01	39,01	39,01	39,01	39,01	39,01	0,00
Italy	62,00	62,00	62,00	62,00	64,34	61,78	62,36	-0,23
Japan	61,06	62,16	62,17	62,17	62,18	62,19	61,99	1,13
Kosovo	46,70	48,70	48,70	46,70	46,70	46,70	46,70	0,00
Latvia	52,17	52,17	52,17	51,66	51,66	51,66	51,91	-0,51
Liechtenstein	70,69	70,89	70,69	70,69	70,89	70,69	70,89	0,00
Lithuania	62,13	62,13	62,13	60,21	62,77	62,77	62,03	0,64
Luxembourg	58,61	58,61	58,61	58,61	59,89	59,89	59,04	1,28
Maœdonia Malta	54,02	54,02	54,02	54,02	54,02	54,02	54,02	0,00
Mexico	40,30	40,30	40,30	40,30	40,30	40,30	40,30	0,00
Moldova	45,13	44,87	44,78	45,45	45,66	40,65	44,39	-4,49
Montenegro	34,57 58,41	35,85 61,71	34,57 57,88	34,57 57,86	37,13 57,86	38,41 57,86	35,85 58,60	3,85
Netherlands	59,95	59,95	59,95	59,95	59,95	59,95	59,95	-0,30
Noway	66,67	69,24	69,24	68,27	70,84	70,84	69,18	4,17
Poland	65,87	61,16	61,16	61,16	61,16	61,16	61,94	4,17
Portugal	65,98	65,98	65,98	70,76	70,76	70,76	68,37	4,78
Republic of Korea	48,74	48,74	48,74	48,74	48,74	48,74	48,74	0,00
Romania	51,35	48,05	49,98	54,58	54,56	49,98	51,41	-1,37
Russian Federation	37,88	37,87	37,88	37,86	37,86	37,85	37,87	-0,03
Serbia	63,60	63,60	63,61	63,61	64,24	64,39	63,84	0,79
Slovakia	65.93	65.93	65.93	65.93	65,93	65.93	65.93	0.00
Slovenia	52,96	52,96	52,96	53,44	53,44	53,44	53,20	0,48
South Africa	66,86	66,86	66,86	66,86	66,86	66,86	66,86	0,00
Spain	64,27	66,22	67,15	67,16	67,19	67,21	66,53	2,94
Sweden	76,19	76,19	76,19	76,19	75,54	76,83	76,19	0,64
Switzerland	76,98	76,98	76,98	76,98	76,98	76,98	76,98	0,00
Turkey	44,15	44,15	44,15	44,15	44,15	44,15	44,15	0,00
Ukraine	47,97	49,48	47,96	49,04	48,95	49,09	48,75	1,12
United Kingdom	49,73	49,71	49,71	49,71	49,72	49,72	49,71	-0,01
United States Of America	67,11	67,11	67,11	67,11	67,10	67,10	67,11	-0,01
Mean (N=57)	56,88	57,00	57,08	57,26	57,51	57,24	57,16	0,36

# Development of the 7 dimensions of the LAI (1990-94; 2015-20)




# Development of the 7 dimensions of the LAI (1990-2020)



# Longitudinal development of the LAI (1990-2020)


- More important increase of the LAI in the first decade
- Gradually slowing down and stabilising towards 2020
- LAI 1990-2020: increase of 7-8%
  - +7.92
     (39 countries)
  - +6.77
     (57 countries)



LAI values for 39 and 57 countries, per time period (1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04, 2005-09, 2010-14 and 2015-2020), standardised

# Determinants and implications of local autonomy

- No significant correlations between the LAI and population, size and number of local governments
- Higher LAI scores in OECD and EU countries, but stronger increase among CoE member states (due to obligations of the Charter)
- Federalist countries do not seem to have more autonomous municipalities



# Determinants and implications of local autonomy

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Table 9.2

the LAI and population Different combinations of regional and local autonomy

-	LAI – high	LAI – medium	LAI – Iow		
RAI – high	Germany, Spain, Switzerland, USA, France	Belgium, Italy, Austria, Argentina, Japan, Netherlands	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Mexico, Russian Federation		
RAI – medium	Colombia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Slovakia, Serbia	Poland, Czech Republic, Greece, North Macedonia	Romania, Croatia, UK, Ireland, Turkey		
RAI – Iow	Finland, Iceland, Estonia	Lithuania, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Montenegro, Albania	Ukraine, Latvia, Chile, Hungary, Kosovo, Israel, Cyprus		

Note: Low, medium, high for RAI and LAI quartiles (2015-2020 means).

 Federalist countries do not seem to have more autonomous municipalities

N=27, 44, 3

# Implications of local autonomy

- Correlation with:
  - Citizen's satisfaction with services and local democracy
  - Perceived importance of local government
  - Trust in local politicians
- Correlation between LAI and implication of COVID-19 pandemic

		LAI_Index_D7 w_2015_2020 s	LAI_Index_D 7w_2015_20 20s
Implication Covid	Pearson Correlation	0,133	<mark>0,357</mark> *
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,329	0,028
	Ν	56	38
Satisfaction Services	Pearson Correlation	<mark>0,388</mark> **	<mark>0,410</mark> *
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,003	0,011
	Ν	56	38
Importance Local	Pearson Correlation	<mark>0,435</mark> **	<mark>0,417</mark> **
Government	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,009
	Ν	55	38
Satisfaction Local	Pearson Correlation	<mark>0,444</mark> **	0,314
Democracy	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,055
	Ν	56	38
Turnout Local Election	Pearson Correlation	0,228	0,180
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,090	0,280
	Ν	56	38
Turnout compared	Pearson Correlation	0,141	0,091
National Elections	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,306	0,594
	Ν	55	37
Trust Local Politicians	Pearson Correlation	0, <mark>289</mark> *	0,266
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,031	0,107
	Ν	56	38
Trust compared to National Politicians	Pearson Correlation	0,000	-0,051
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,997	0,766
	Ν	54	37

I AL Index D7 I AL Index D

# Implications of local autonomy

### Additional questions

#### **Implication of Covid-19 Pandemic**

Implication of	The extent to which	0-3	0 local government autonomy has generally decreased
Covid-19 the autonomy of local government has been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic		with the Covid-19 pandemic	
		1 local government autonomy has not been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic	
			2 local government autonomy in health has increased with the Covid-19 pandemic
			3 local government autonomy in health and in other fields related to the Covid-19 pandemic has increased

#### Satisfaction with local government service delivery

Satisfaction     The extent to which or which local       with local     the citizens are or satisfied with local       government     satisfied with local       service     government service       delivery     delivery	0-3	0 citizens are generally not satisfied at all with local government service delivery
		1 citizens are generally moderately satisfied with local government service delivery
		2 citizens are generally mostly satisfied with local government service delivery
		3 citizens are generally entirely satisfied with local government service delivery

#### Importance of local government for citizens

Importance of local         The extent to which local government has an important role in the daily life of citizens         0-	local government has an important role in the daily life of	life o 1 lo	0 local government is not important at all in the daily life of citizens
			1 local government is somewhat important in the daily life of citizens
		$\ensuremath{2}$ local government is important in the daily life of citizens	
			3 local government is very important in the daily life of

### Satisfaction with local democracy

Satisfaction	The extent to	which	0-4	0 citizens are not at all satisfied with local democracy
with local the citizens are democracy satisfied with local democracy		1 citizens are rather not satisfied with local democracy		
			2 citizens are neither dissatisfied nor satisfied with loca democracy	
		3 citizens are rather satisfied with local democracy		
				4 citizens are entirely satisfied with local democracy

### **Turnout at local elections**

Turnout at	Electoral turnout at	0-4	0 no elections
general elections)	1 between 1 and 25 %		
		2 between 26 and 50 %	
		3 between 51 and 75 %	
			4 between 76 and 100 %

### **Electoral participation**

Electoral       The extent to which electoral participation on local level on local level is higher than on national level electoral participation on national level       0-2         on local level compared to electoral participation on national level electoral participation on national level       0.2       0.2	electoral participation	participation vel is higher	0 electoral participation on local level is generally lower than electoral participation on national level
			1 electoral participation on local and on national level are very much the same
	2 electoral participation on local level is generally higher than electoral participation on national level		

### **Trustworthiness of local politicians**

Perception of trustworthine ss of local politicians	trustworthine local politicians are ss of local trustworthy	0-4	0 local politicians are not at all trustworthy 1 local politicians are rather not trustworthy 2 local politicians moderately trustworthy 3 local politicians are rather trustworthy
			4 local politicians are very much trustworthy

# Summary and conclusions (1/2)

- 57 countries (EU, CoE, OECD) covered over a 30-year period (1990-2020)
- General and progressive increase (~8%) in local autonomy (variables, dimensions and LAI) with few fluctuations in recent years
- Highest scoring group: Nordic countries alongside Switzerland, France, Portugal and the USA
- Lowest scoring group: Cyprus, Malta, Israel, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Moldova

# Summary and conclusions (2/2)

- Positive correlation with citizen's satisfaction, trust in local politicians and implication of COVID-19 pandemic
- No correlations with population, size and number of local governments or type of political system (federal/unitary)
- Solid and comprehensive springboard for academics and policymakers: eg. Effects of local autonomy on Local Democracy (Daubler et al 2018, Gendzwill, 2021); Tipologies of Local Government (Heinelt, 2018), etc.

Thank you!